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“Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics”
Kyle J. Wolfley, Assistant Professor
Department of Social Sciences, West Point
Paper Presentation for the 2019 International Studies Association Annual Convention (Updated)
Abstract: How do major powers use militaries to cope with diverse threats in a complex
environment of costly conventional war, emerging power competition, as well as the persistent
challenge of violent non-state actors? I argue that multinational military exercises provide a tool
for major powers to reduce the unpredictability of non-state threats as well as to weaken other
powers through balancing and regime-promotion. The number of multinational exercises has
increased substantially since the Cold War, which is puzzling given the end of superpower rivalry
and incentives to enjoy the peace dividend. Textual analysis and regressions of over a thousand
multinational military exercises from 1980-2016 reveal that major powers reacted to an increase in
strategic uncertainty by implementing exercises as a means to combat ambiguous non-state threats.
Yet as major power competition becomes more intense, I expect major powers to leverage these
same types of exercises to undermine one another.

Although scholars disagree about how to accurately define the current international system,1
one point seems clear: major powers must deal with a growing number of threats in what could
be considered a “new era of upheaval.”2 The apparent return of great power competition is
compounded by the seemingly unending threat of non-state actors that countries have struggled
to defeat since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, nuclear weapons and changing norms
have increased the costs of interstate war3 and the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have
revealed the limits of using military force against non-state actors. In this complex environment
of emerging competition, costly conventional war, as well as the persistent challenge of violent
non-state actors, how do major powers use the military ‘tool’ to address these diverse threats? I
argue that multinational military exercises are and will remain a prominent means for major
powers to manage both the unpredictability of non-state threats as well as to weaken other
powers through balancing and regime-promotion.

1

Some argue that the distribution of capabilities is becoming more multipolar, while others argue that
America’s economic and technological dominance will continue to dominate. For an example of the former, see
John J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014); Randall
Schweller, “Three Cheers for Trump’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2018),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-08-13/three-cheers-trumps-foreign-policy. For the latter, see
Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2018); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the TwentyFirst Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,” International Security 40, no. 3 (Winter
2015/2016): 7-53.
2
Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, “America and the Geopolitics of Upheaval,” The National Interest, June 21,
2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-the-geopolitics-upheaval-21258.
3
Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,” American Political Science Review 96,
no. 1 (March 2002): 1-14; John Mueller, “War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment,” Political Science
Quarterly 124, No. 2 (Summer 2009): 297-321; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York, Public Affairs,
2011), 29-33.
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Over the last twenty-five years, military exercises have become an important foreign policy
tool as the number of multinational training events increased substantially since the end of the
Cold War despite the end of superpower rivalry (see Figure 1 below). Although traditionally
viewed as a means for armies to prepare for war or deter adversaries, states are increasingly
using military training as an instrument of statecraft to influence both partners and rivals. For
instance, in the 1990’s the US used military exercises to encourage liberal values and recruit
European partners for multilateral missions,4 while more recently Russia hosted military training
to prevent terrorism and democratic revolution in neighboring states.5 Major powers often use
these types of multinational training to address ambiguous non-state threats; however, they also
can leverage exercises to compete with one another in an era in which interstate conventional
war would produce enormous costs.
The intention of this article is twofold: first, to explore the concept of military statecraft in
order to better understand how states use militaries to achieve political goals in a complex
environment; second, to determine why multinational exercises increased after the end of USSoviet competition. The dramatic rise of multilateral exercises since the end of the Cold War is
puzzling: without the threat of great power war, the incentives to enjoy the ‘peace dividend’ and
reduce military operations abroad were immense.6 Some may point to the internationally-active
American grand strategy of liberal hegemony as a possible cause of this increase in US-led
exercises,7 yet non-US major powers—including Russia, China, and India—also increased their
use of multinational training sometime after the end of the Cold War.8 Moreover, this rise in
multilateral exercises in the 1990s and 2000s actually coincided with a decrease in war, both
interstate and intrastate.9 Yet in the decades following 1991, not only the US but all major
powers expanded the number of multinational military exercises to meet or surpass Cold Warlevels.10 What explains this continual rise since the early 1990’s?
For a discussion of the origin and purpose of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, see James Goldgeier,
Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999),
26-29. See also Michael Rühle and Nicholas Williams, “Partnership for Peace: A Personal View from NATO,”
Parameters 24, no. 4 (1994): 66-75; “Partnership for Peace: Framework Document,” North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, original publication January 11, 1994, modified October 31, 2000, accessed January 7, 2017,
https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/4995/c940110b.htm.
5
See, for example, Erica Marat, The Military and the State in Central Asia: From Red Army to Independence
(New York: Routledge, 2010), 94. For a compressive discussion of Russian-led exercises with the Collective
Security Treaty Organization, see Marcel De Haas, “War Games of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization: Drills on the Move!” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 3 (July
2, 2016): 378–406.
6
For an argument in favor of exploiting the peace dividend, see Jeane Kirkpatrick, “A Normal Country in a
Normal Time,” National Interest (Fall 1990): 40-43.
7
For a description of grand strategy of liberal hegemony or “deep engagement”, see Stephen G. Brooks, G.
John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,”
International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012/2013): 7-51. Recent works that view liberal hegemony after the Cold
War as sub-optimal and an overextension of US power include Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions:
America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018); John
J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2018).
8
A graph of exercises by each major power is included in the Appendix.
9
Andrew Mack, “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline,” Coping with Crisis
Working Paper Series (International Peace Academy Publications, 2007).
10
Though there are different terms describing military training, I interchangeably use ‘exercise’, ‘maneuver’, or
‘training’ as opposed to other terms used by journalists, such as war games, which implies preparation for war
4
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Figure 1: Number of Land-Based Multinational Military Exercises per Year Involving a
Major Power, 1980-2016, by Exercise Type. 11
I argue that major powers increased their use of multinational exercises after the end of the
Cold War as a response to an increase in strategic uncertainty; that is, when the type and location
of the threat is unknown, as well as whether other states will support operations to combat these
threats. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of superpower rivalry, compounded with the
destabilizing forces of globalization, presented military planners with a challenge: how to
prepare for operations against an unknown threat. As Figure 1 reveals, in the early 1990’s major
powers began increasing the number of non-traditional ‘shaping’ military exercises: training
events used not for traditional war rehearsals or deterrence, but instead to change the character of
or relationship between states. More specifically, major powers use these types of exercises to
recruit allies, build the capacity of weaker armies, shape the role of partner forces, and even
develop trust among adversaries. I argue these types of exercises served as a rational means to
reduce strategic uncertainty by influencing other militaries to help combat violent non-state
threats, such as terrorism, ethnic war, and humanitarian disasters.
The prevalence of shaping exercises contrasts sharply with the final decade of the Cold War.
Throughout this superpower rivalry, the US and Soviet Union operated globally, yet they
(which I categorize as only one type of military exercise). By ‘multinational’, I refer to two or more states involved
in the exercise. A graph of exercises by major power are included in the Appendix. As explained in the research
design section, I include as major powers those delineated by the authors of the Correlates of War (CoW) State
System Membership Project, which, from 1945-2016 include countries include the United States, Great Britain,
France, Germany, Russia, China, and Japan. However, I make two alterations: I remove Japan but include India due
to Japan’s constitutional inability to deploy troops abroad (biasing against one type of exercise option) and India’s
ranking as the third largest power according to CoW’s Composite Index of National Capabilities.
11
My datasets are described in the Research Design section below.
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planned for conventional battle in Europe and supported proxies against each other’s partners in
other regions of the world.12 These great powers used primarily traditional exercises—war
rehearsals and deterrence—to both prepare for and prevent war against each other. However, the
rise of violent non-state actors after the dissolution of communist states presented planners with
acute uncertainty about the nature of the threat and potential allies. Non-traditional, cooperative
military exercises were a solution to this problem. Although these non-traditional exercises were
a means to tackle the threat posed by non-state actors, since 2010 the US and Russia have
revived the use of traditional exercises (rehearsals and deterrence) as great power rivalry has
returned. Moreover, major powers can leverage shaping against one another as a form of
balancing by attracting allies and influencing the character of other militaries. As conventional
war is rare, yet the persistent threat of violent non-state actors seems unending, scholars and
practitioners would benefit from a better understanding of the varied use of military power.
In order to test my argument, I first analyze US Army operational doctrine over the last three
decades and conduct logit regressions using a new dataset of land-based, major power-led
multinational exercises from 1980 to 2016. I then expand the tests to include all current major
powers. The results reveal that a rise in strategic uncertainty about threats and partners led to an
increase in the number and scope of exercises even when controlling for other explanations.
This article proceeds in four stages. First, I examine the concept of military statecraft and offer a
typology of military exercises with a view toward traditional theories of military doctrine and
power. Second, I further describe my puzzle about the increase in multinational exercises since
the end of the Cold War and elucidate my argument as well as the alternatives. Third, I describe
my research design and, fourth, I offer my statistical test results. I conclude with a discussion
about the future of exercises in world politics, especially given the apparent return of great power
competition.

Military Statecraft, Shaping Operations, and Multinational Exercises
Military Statecraft in a Complex Environment
I define military statecraft as a state’s use of military means to achieve foreign policy
ends.13 The military ‘tool’ is one among several available to states in achieving various goals—
the others being diplomacy, economics, and information using Lasswell’s classic framework

12
The assumption that the source and location of potential war during the Cold War was between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact in Europe was prevalent in both policy and academic debates in the 1980’s. For an example, see
John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, Eliot A. Cohen, Steven J. Zologa, Malcom Chalmers, and Lutz Unterseher,
“Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment and the Tank Gap Data Flap,” International Security 13, No. 4
(Spring 1989): 128-179. Moreover, Lawrence Freedman notes that major power war-planning, “all took place
within a cold-war context, in which the enemy was both well known and substantial, and the problem to be solved
was deterring and if necessary resisting aggression across the inner German border. The focus was therefore on a
classic great power confrontation between large armies in the center of Europe.” Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A
History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 198-201.
13
I use the term ‘foreign policy’ instead of ‘grand strategy’ since the goals of foreign policy are numerous (e.g.
power, security, wealth, leadership, status, protecting human rights, alleviating human suffering) while the objective
of grand strategy is usually achieving national security (however defined). Thus, a state may use its military for
non-security reasons, such as to increase its status globally, protect individuals from government repression, or to
rescue foreigners during a natural disaster.
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(often organized into the acronym “DIME”).14 Yet my conceptualization is broader than more
traditional uses of the concept that focus purely on the threat or use of force, which I argue is
only one category of military activity.15 There are two main clusters of military means or ‘tools’
available to states: traditional operations and shaping operations. Traditional operations
encompass military activities designed to threaten or use violent force through coercive
diplomacy16, deterrence, or actual combat. These types of missions are widely explored in
studies of military doctrine and military power, against both state and non-state threats.17
Shaping operations, by contrast, are military-led activities designed to influence both partners
and rivals by changing the character of other armies or altering the relationship between
militaries. States often employ shaping as a non-warfighting, cooperative use of military force to
proactively influence their environments to become more benign or favorable. States frequently
use shaping to prevent war, usually through recruiting and training partners to provide stability in
conflict-prone regions, but shaping can also be leveraged to gain an advantage over an opponent,
such as through the supplying of friendly proxies against a rival state.18 Common shaping
activities include military diplomacy through student officer exchanges and senior leader visits,19

14

Harold Laswell: Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 204-205; see
also in Baldwin, 13.
15
For instance, David Baldwin defines military statecraft as, “influence attempts relying primarily on violence,
weapons, or force.”15 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 14. In
a more recent work, Baldwin highlights the preoccupation with “military force” in the majority of IR scholarship on
power, most of which assumes military statecraft is used as the threat or use of force. David A. Baldwin, Power and
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 109-111, 178-188.
16
Fearon shows how states can mobilize troops to signal resolve as a bargaining maneuver during crises. James
D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” The American Political
Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 579-580.
17
The major works on military doctrine include: Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France,
Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, The Ideology
of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 27;
Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9,
no. 1 (Summer 1984): 58-107; Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine
Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Regarding conventional military power, see
Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2004). For the use or threat of force against non-state actors in counterinsurgency, humanitarian intervention,
and peacekeeping missions, see Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining
Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Winter, 2009): 67-106; Martha
Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs of Intervention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003);
Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
18
In one of the few academic works on shaping operations, Derek Reveron views shaping as a form of “soft
power” used to attract rather than coerce partners. I agree that one goal of shaping is to attract other militaries
through activities such as military diplomacy and security assistance, yet I argue that the goal of shaping can also be
to undermine opponents through, for instance, proxy wars. See Derek S. Reveron, “Shaping the Security
Environment,” in Shaping the Security Environment, ed. Derek S. Reveron, (Newport: Naval War College Press,
2007).
19
Concerning student exchanges, see Carol Atkinson, Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy through Military
Educational Exchange, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014); concerning workshops and seminars, see
Alexandra Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe’,” International
Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn 2005): 973-1012. For a counterargument which highlights the negative
consequences of military officer exchanges, see Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley, “When Human
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security cooperation through arms sales and training,20 the forward presence of troops on foreign
soil,21 among others.22
Shaping activities differ from traditional operations, such as offensive or defensive maneuvers,
in that they are designed not to seize or protect territory against enemy troops, but to change
other militaries’ patterns of behavior. For instance, instead of intervening in a civil war, a state
may choose to have its army train a partner force to combat insurgents in lieu of the state’s own
military. Shaping operations are also levied to change the relationship between militaries; for
instance, from neutral states to coalition partners or from hostile to friendly. Moreover, shaping
operations part ways from deterrent operations as shaping is conducted before, during, and even
after conventional operations take place: as deterrence is an attempt to convince an opponent that
the costs of invasion outweigh the benefits, deterrence usually ends when major war operations
begin.23 Although the US and Soviet Union used some forms of shaping during the Cold War—
particularly by providing arms and low-level training to proxies24–shaping operations became far
more prominent after the end of the Cold War as the US began to grapple regional instability and
humanitarian crises in Europe and Africa.25
Military Exercises
Military exercises are a prominent tool of military statecraft that run the spectrum of both
traditional (threat and use of force) and non-traditional (shaping) operations. At the most basic
level, military training prepares soldiers and units for combat or other types of missions.
However, most militaries hold joint exercises with one another and states often use multinational
exercises—those involving two or more states—as a means to influence others. Multinational
exercises vary extensively by number of participating troops and type of training tasks: largescale conventional maneuver exercises may include over 100,000 troops while small disaster
relief training may involve only a few hundred soldiers. Many exercises are conducted on a
regular basis (such as annual and biannual), while others are conducted only as single events.
According to US military doctrine, all multinational exercises—to varying degrees—seek to
improve interoperability: that is, the ability for two or more military forces to execute each
Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and Coups,” Journal of Peace Research
Vol. 54, No. 4 (2017): 542-557.
20
Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing
Face of the US Military (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016).
21
Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, “‘The Empire Will Compensate You’: The Structural Dynamics of the U.S.
Overseas Basing Network,” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 4 (2013): 1034-1050.
22
Joseph Nye develops an alternative conceptualization of military power based on four ‘modalities’ or types of
military action: fighting, coercive diplomacy, protection, and assistance. Though useful for an updated, general
understanding of military power, my framework is built on more specific operations grounded in military doctrine.
Moreover, it is difficult to situate most shaping exercises—recruitment, role-forming, and trust-developing—within
his framework. Nye, The Future of Power, 29-45.
23
Although there is some conceptual overlap between types, this distinction between operations—offensive,
defensive, deterrent, and shaping—is described in Joint Operations, US Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, January 17, 2017), V-7 through V-13.
24
For instance, see Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the
Americas (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); John H. Coatsworth, “The Cold War in Central America, 19751991,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 3, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 216-218.
25
Reveron, “Shaping the Security Environment,” 1-5.
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other’s doctrine, conduct joint planning, and ensure that technologies are compatible.26
However, multinational training events can be broken down into different types according to the
primary function that they serve (Figure 2 below).27 Traditional types include deterrence and
rehearsal exercises, while shaping types include recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming,
and trust-developing exercises. Thus, multinational exercises provide interesting variation,
across time and space, which can inform us about the different ways states use military means to
achieve their goals.
Traditional exercises, those intended for rehearsal and/or deterrence,28 are sometimes
mentioned in the traditional works in military doctrine and statecraft.29 Rehearsals are
conducted in order to test whether allies or coalition partners are properly prepared for an
upcoming or potential mission, which can include war, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping,
disaster relief, or other tasks charged to the military. Rehearsals may be used to practice
mobilizations for invasions or counterattacks, such as the Russian Kavkaz-2008 or Zapad-2013
exercises, while others may prepare militaries and other governmental agencies for humanitarian
crises, such as the European Union’s MILEX planning and training events.30 Rehearsals also
include exercises designed to test emerging doctrine, as demonstrated by Imperial Germany’s
annual Kriegsspiel that allowed senior army officers to experiment with different operational
concepts at the turn of the twentieth century.31
Deterrence exercises are conducted by two or more states that seek to convince an opponent
that the costs of attack outweigh the benefits, either through denial or punishment. Military
exercises signal deterrence in two ways: (1) by denial through the showcasing of capabilities that
would make invasion too costly and (2) by punishment through performing tasks that
demonstrate the military’s ability to counterattack across borders as a response to an invasion.32
Armies may use exercises to signal both immediate and general deterrence: in times of
immediate crisis, a military exercise can send a clear signal of capability and resolve to a specific
opponent. For general deterrence, military training can also be used to “maintain a broad

26

Multinational Operations, US Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, July
16, 2013), I-9.
27
This typology was developed in Kyle Wolfley, “Training Not to Fight: How Major Powers Use Multinational
Military Exercises to Reduce Strategic Uncertainty,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 2018.
28
In one of the few academic works on military exercises, Blackwill and Legro do not separate training
functions by rehearsal or deterrence but point to both of these functions as objectives in NATO and Warsaw Pact
exercises during the Cold War; see Robert D. Blackwill and Jeffrey W. Legro, “Constraining Ground Force
Exercises of NATO and the Warsaw Pact,” International Security 14, no. 3 (Winter 1989/1990): 68-98.
29
For instance, Jack Snyder highlights the role that map and field exercises served in allowing the German army
to rehearse war plans before World War I, while Stephen Rosen discusses how exercise serve as a way for militaries
to test doctrine. See Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 141-147; Rosen, Winning the Next War, 68-75.
30
Pauli Järvenpää, Zapad-2013: A View from Helsinki, August 2014 (Washington D.C.: The Jamestown
Foundation, 2014), 1-6; “Press Release: EU Military Exercise 2007 (MILEX 07) to be conducted from 7-15 June
2007,” Press Release from the Council of the European Union, June 4, 2007,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/94472.pdf.
31
For a discussion of how (unilateral) exercises serve as opportunities to evaluate and improve doctrine, see
Nina Kollars, “Genius and Mastery in Military Innovation,” Survival 59, no. 2 (2017): 125-138.
32
I borrow the language of deterrence by punishment and denial from Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and
Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 14-16. Snyder
attributes this distinction to Robert E. Osgood, “A Theory of Deterrence,” unpublished manuscript, 1960.
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military capability” and discourage any opponent from contemplating attack.33 Annual exercises
‘Foal Eagle’ and ‘Team Spirit’ between the US and South Korea are examples of maneuvers
intended to deter an invasion from North Korea.34 Of course, one military exercise can serve
both functions of deterrence and rehearsal, as was the case for NATO REFORGER and Warsaw
Pact exercises during the Cold War35; however, this combination of the two functions is not
necessary, such as exercises in preparation for deployments to an active war zone or
peacekeeping mission.
Shaping exercises, conversely, serve other purposes beyond mere threatening or using force;
states leverage these types of exercises in order influence how two armies relate or to alter the
character of an army, which ultimately reduces strategic uncertainty (explained below). There
are four types of shaping exercises: recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, and trustdeveloping. States use recruitment exercises to convince partners to join a multilateral mission
or to build relationships with potential allies. States are incentivized to gain the diplomatic or
military support of other states for multilateral missions, as long as the time horizon and
operational commitment allow.36 Recruitment exercises attempt to attract partners by not only
convincing the government (including the military) to join a coalition, but also by persuading the
population that this partnership is beneficial for the country.37 This attempt to attract partners by
persuading the population to join a mission could be considered a form of public diplomacy, one
type of ‘soft power’ described by Nye.38 By gaining the support of other militaries, major
powers seek to reduce the uncertainty associated with which states will offer assistance to these
types of missions. Moreover, major powers may use recruitment exercises simply to build
stronger relations with other states and create more certainty about which states are friendly and
which are threatening. NATO’s Partnership for Peace program during the 1990’s is an example
of an exercise program designed to recruit future members as well as partners for a potential
peacekeeping mission in the Balkans. States may also use military exercises to attract and
practice with potential allies as a form of balancing against an adversary.39 The US military’s
closer military cooperation with India and China’s training with Pakistan could be early attempts
to attract allies against one another.40

33

For a discussion of the difference between general and immediate deterrence, see Patrick M. Morgan,
Deterrence Now, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9. See also Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A
Conceptual Analysis, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983).
34
Vito D’Orazio, “War Games: North Korea’s Reaction to US and South Korean Military Exercises,” Journal
of East Asian Studies 12 (2012): 275-294.
35
For an in-depth discussion of NATO and Warsaw Pact exercises during the Cold War, see Robert D.
Blackwill and Jeffrey W. Legro, “Constraining Ground Force Exercises of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.”
36
Sarah E. Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions After the Cold War (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2011).
37
According to a senior planner for NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, this was one of the goals for these
types of exercises with former Warsaw Pact members. Anonymous former US official at NATO familiar with
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, phone interview by author, July 26, 2017.
38
Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power, 100-109.
39
See Robert Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East
Asia,” Security Studies 15, no.3 (July-September 2006): 389-391.
40
Franz-Stefan Gady, “India, US, and Japan Conclude ‘Malabar’ Military Exercise,” The Diplomat, June 19,
2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/india-us-and-japan-conclude-malabar-military-exercise/. Ankit Panda,
“China, Pakistan Conclude Bilateral Counterterrorism Exercises,” The Diplomat, January 8, 2019,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/china-pakistan-conclude-bilateral-counterterrorism-exercises/.
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Capacity-building exercises are intended to increase the capability of a partner army to
provide its own security and preclude the need for future intervention. By assisting with the
training and mentorship necessary to carry out their own operations, major power militaries seek
to reduce the uncertainty of threats emanating from fragile regions.41 Moreover, major powers
hope that the capabilities of the partner are increased to the degree that future intervention
becomes unnecessary. Thus, major powers ‘delegate’ responsibility to these fragile partners.
British support for the Royal Sierra Leonean Armed Forces in the 2000’s is an example of this
type of training program.42
Role-forming exercises are a state’s means to alter what role that army serves for its society:
for instance, whether that army will protect its regime from internal threats or deploy abroad for
peacekeeping missions.43 By encouraging certain practices during exercises, such as respect for
international law or stability through repression, major power militaries hope to create
expectations of military behavior and reduce the uncertainty of the source of threats. By
influencing the role these partners serve for their societies, major powers hope that these nonallies will become friendlier to the major power’s interests in the future. Russian-led exercises in
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) designed to train former Soviet Republic
armies how to prevent violent revolutions serves as an example of this type of training.
Trust-developing exercises are a state’s attempt to build trust and confidence between rival
militaries in order to prevent inadvertent war. Though major power rivals view each other with
suspicion, if they are not engaged in open hostility they often will attempt to ameliorate tensions
and build friendly relations. Major power rivals attempt to prevent the onset of accidental war
through joint training by altering their soldiers’ perceptions of one another to be viewed as more
‘human’ than adversarial. As rival soldiers interact along contested borders, on the seas, or in
proxy states, major powers hope these individuals or units can de-escalate crises by not assuming
the worst of intentions in one another but cooperate to find a mutual solution. The rise of nonstate threats such as terrorism provides a suitable excuse for major power rivals to cooperate.
Annual “Hand-in-Hand” exercises between China and India since 2006 offer an example of
trust-developing exercises.44 Figure 2 below provides a typology of military exercise types as
well as how the exercise is used as a means of statecraft.

41
Kathleen J. McInnis and Nathan J. Lucas, “What is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’ Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service, December 18, 2015, pg. 5, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf. Robert M.
Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3
(May/June 2010): 2-6. Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich, “The Strategy of Sponsorship,” Survival 57, no. 5
(September 3, 2015): 121-148.
42
Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone, 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy, and Development
in Action, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge Journals,
2014).
43
The ‘roles’ that militaries serve for their societies are described in Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, and
Andrew Cottey, “Armed Forces and Society: A Framework for Analysis,” in Soldiers and Societies in
Postcommunist Europe, eds. Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, and Andrew Cottey, (Basingstoke: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2003), 8-15.
44
For example: “India, China to Hold First-Ever Army Exercises in December,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific,
November 21, 2007, LexisNexis Academic.

9

Exercise
Type

Operation
Type

Goal of Exercise

Mechanism of Influence/
Uncertainty Reduction

Rehearsal

Traditional

Win war or achieve
mission success with
partners

Increase the joint readiness of troops, equipment,
and doctrine

Deterrence

Traditional

Prevent undesirable
behavior from rivals

Convince opponent that costs of invasion
outweigh benefits

Recruitment

Shaping

Secure help from others
against state or non-state
actors

Encourage and prepare partners for alliance
membership, multilateral mission, or potential
conflict. Reduce uncertainty of allied assistance.

CapacityBuilding

Shaping

Delegate mission to other
states to combat non-state
actors

Strengthen partner to provide own security or
participate in regional missions. Reduce
uncertainty of threat emergence.

RoleForming

Shaping

Change behavior of other
militaries

Influence character of partner military to fulfill
particular roles and develop certain practices.
Reduce uncertainty of threat emergence.

TrustDeveloping

Shaping

Prevent war with rivals

Change perceptions from hostile to friendly to
prevent escalation of hostilities. Reduce
uncertainty of threat emergence.

Figure 2: Typology of Multinational Military Exercises

The Puzzle and Argument
As revealed in Figure 1 above, overall multinational military exercises involving at least one
major power increased substantially in the mid-1990’s. Although common during the last
decade of the Cold War, this behavior is puzzling given the incentives for major powers to enjoy
the peace dividend by focusing on domestic issues and reducing defense spending after the
conclusion of superpower rivalry. As represented in Figure 3 below, another puzzling feature of
this phenomenon is that major powers began increasing training with non-allies. By allies I refer
to permanent, defense-pact signatories (formal alliances) as well as mission-based (‘ad-hoc’)
coalition partners.45 Training with these types of partners is commonsensical: they allow major
powers and partners to practice interoperability and usually serve the functions of deterrence,
rehearsal, or both. However, major powers have increasingly conducted exercises with nonallies, which fall into one of the following categories: (1) partners that are not treaty allies or adhoc coalition partners; (2) defense pact signatories that do not actually operate together in
missions or attempt to deter an adversary.46 Exercises with non-allies (even rivals) is
For defense-pact signatories, I use “Type I” formal defense pacts according to the Correlates of War
typology; see Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances, 1648-2008, Volume 2, (Washington D.C.: CQ
Press, 2009). A list of ground-based multilateral coalitions that I apply in my dataset from 1980-2016 is listed in
Appendix B.
46
I include in this group Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) since the CSTO
represents more of a security organization intended to regulate member behavior and respond to non-state threats,
since there have been no CSTO deployments since the organization’s inception and the Central Asian states are of
45
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counterintuitive given the opportunity costs of training with weaker partners, the incentives to
hide military doctrine and technology from untrustworthy militaries, and the need to abide by the
military imperatives of deception and surprise against rivals.

Figure 3: Number of Land-Based MMEs per Year Involving a Major Power, Including Either
Only Allies (“Ally”) or at least one Non-Ally (“Non-Ally”), 1980-2016

The Argument
Given the incentives against increasing multinational exercises (especially with non-allies), I
argue that major powers increased the number of military exercises after the end of superpower
rivalry for two reasons. First, both government officials and military officers viewed military
exercises as an effective means to reduce strategic uncertainty, which increased substantially
after the end of the Cold War. By strategic uncertainty I refer to a lack of predictability in
forecasting potential threats and partners, which creates problems for military planning. This
increase in strategic uncertainty was the product of the rise of violent non-state actors wrought
by the collapse of communism and forces of globalization, which forced military planners and
leaders to develop a means to proactively influence their environments in order to prevent
instability and surprise. Second, military exercises continued to proliferate due to the habitual
nature of military training and relationships. As previously stated, training is necessary for all
militaries to prepare for combat; exercises are conducted on a regular basis to train and test the
little use for deterrence against NATO. See Gregory Gleason and Marat E. Shaihutdinov, “Collective Security and
Non-State Actors in Eurasia,” International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005): 274-284.
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readiness of units. Many, but not all, MMEs are held on an annual, biannual, or quadrennial
basis. As major powers begin military relationships with other states, these partnerships
sometimes last beyond the initial exercise as major powers view these continuing relationships as
positive for national security. Thus, like military training in general, MMEs are inherently
‘sticky’, creating a cumulative effect as military relations continue over time.

Strategic Uncertainty and Military Planning
Uncertainty presents an acute problem for military planning, both before and during conflict.
Militaries attempt to minimize uncertainty through reconnaissance and the collection of
intelligence, which provide information about potential enemies and battlefields. Military
planners incorporate numerous variables into their plans, including geography, weather, history,
civilian considerations, enemy composition, as well as the capabilities of their own forces and
allies (among a host of other variables), in order to gain an advantage and reduce unpredictability
during battle.47 Yet war’s inherent uncertainty results in the inability for planners to confidently
predict the outbreak, outcome, and consequences of conflict.48 Even before large-scale
conventional war, when planners are confident about which enemy they will be facing and the
general direction in which to anticipate attack, a level of uncertainty still remains about how the
battle will ensue. For instance, French military planners before World War I were unsure about
whether the German army would invade through Belgium or the Alsace-Lorraine; decisions
about where to position forces and whether to conduct counteroffensives were tied to this
uncertainty.49
The problem of strategic uncertainty for military planning becomes even more severe when
threats and assistance are unknown. Especially given the unpredictable nature of non-state
threats (such as terrorism and transnational crime) as well as expansive potential locations of
threats (e.g. failed states, overpopulated cities, impoverished regions), military planners are faced
with a complex strategic environment. When militaries are unsure about who is a threat, from
where threats will emanate, and who will be an ally against these threats, they are unable to
properly plan for contingencies and develop an appropriate conventional doctrine to address this
uncertainty. I argue that militaries face strategic uncertainty from two sources: (1) threats (who
is a threat and from where does it emanate); (2) assistance (who will provide support in
addressing these threats). Militaries may be uncertain about two aspects of threats: namely, their
character and location. First, military planners assess the ‘who’ of threats: whether danger will
originate from state conventional (and nuclear) adversaries, non-state insurgents, transnational
criminals, or natural disasters. Second, uncertainty may also arise from an inability to predict the
location of threats, especially in regards to violent non-state actors, pandemics, or natural
disasters. Military planners are concerned about the assistance they receive from others: whether
potential allies will contribute to multilateral missions and whether fragile militaries are capable
and willing to provide security for themselves. In order to address these two sources of
47
See, for instance, Joint Planning, US Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office,
June 16, 2017), IV-10 through IV-14.
48
Concerning the inability to predict the outcomes of war, see Jonathon Kirshner, “Rationalist Explanations for
War?” Security Studies 10, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 143-150. See also Jonathon Kirshner, “The Economic Sins of
Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist Alternative,” World Politics 67, no. 1 (January 2015): 155-183.
49
Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 41-48.
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uncertainty that increased after the end of the Cold War, military planners increased the number
of shaping operations.

The Rise in Strategic Uncertainty after the Cold War
The end of the Cold War resulted in the rise of non-state threats beginning in the early 1990’s,
which was a function of two main sources: (1) the collapse of communism and (2) the
consequences of globalization. Though the end of the Cold War marked the conclusion of the
prospect for great power war, the lack of incentives to bolster client states as a buffer against an
adversary’s sphere of influence produced significant effects. Kalyvas and Balcells argue that
although the number of civil war onsets declined after 1991, the end of the Cold War changed
the relationship between the two great powers and their clients: without the need to counter each
other’s influence, both the US and Russia limited or withdrew their funding in peripheral
regions, causing the loss of state capacity, proliferation of weapons, and civil wars.50 Another
major source of new threats spawned from the consequences of globalization: Mary Kaldor
argues that ‘new wars’—conflicts that are fought by public militaries and private citizens over
identity politics and blur conventional war, organized crime, and violations of human rights—
arose from the impacts of globalization. She argues that new wars emerge from the loss of
political sovereignty and autonomy as well as the disintegration of states; without a monopoly
over the legitimate use of force, states with little capacity are challenged to maintain order and
provide security for their citizens.51
The threats that emerged from the fall of communism and consequences of globalization
posed unique problems for military planners since the threat type (state vs. non-state) and
location were largely unknown. Although the threat of great power war imposed a shadow over
the Cold War, the source and location of both conventional and unconventional proxy threats
were relatively known. In contrast, terrorism, ethnic war, transnational crime, and resource
scarcity could arise suddenly and from many parts of the world. Mikkel Rasmussen argues that,
“Globalisation means that Western strategy is increasingly focused on managing risks rather than
creating enduring security. Following the Cold War, this has meant a gradual recalibrating of
doctrines from logic of deterrence to a management logic.”52 As the strategic environment
moved from “predictability to unpredictability”, Western strategists were forced to transition
away from a reliance on containment against the Soviets when “international security was
50
Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of
the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,” American Political Science Review 104, No. 3 (August 2010): 421-423.
The authors contest the notion that the end of the Cold War had no impact on civil wars by showing how the
technologies of rebellion (guerrilla vs. symmetric non-conventional) as well as the geographic location of rebellion
changed. Supporting the first argument, see James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,”
American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-86.
51
Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2012). Additional works of the impact of globalization and non-state threats on state security include Jonathan
Kirshner ed., Globalization and National Security (New York: Routledge, 2006); Robert O. Keohane, “The
Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the ‘Liberalism of Fear’.” Dialog-International
Organization (Spring 2002): 29-43; Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International
Terrorism,” International Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/2003): 30-58.
52
Mikkel Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 95.
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predictable and calculable.” Rather, after the end of the Cold War strategists adopted a
‘meteorologist’ mentality as an attempt to predict and hedge against an unpredictable security
environment.53
My argument holds that shaping exercises have proliferated since the end of the Cold War due
to an increase in strategic uncertainty, wrought by the rise in non-state threats. Though the risk
of high-intensity, conventional war was high during the Cold War, the source (state actors) and
location (Europe) were generally known by strategic planners.54 However, especially since the
end of the Cold War, major power militaries have increasingly struggled to predict the source
and location from which threats will emanate. US senior military leaders have emphasized this
growing uncertainty. The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the graduating class of
the National Defense University in 2016: “In the environment we are in today, with the
complexity and volatility and variety of challenges we have, how do we assess risk? ... How do
we assess the capabilities or capacities that must exist in the joint force? A part of this is also
how to prepare for the unexpected.”55 Comparing the current strategic environment to the Cold
War, US Army Pacific Commander General Robert Brown noted in a recent interview:
It's amazing how complex the world has become. I often would joke, 'The last
time I was bored was in the Cold War.' I was a company commander, and I had a
responsibility in an area against the Soviets. You know, they could have come
across but you kind of knew they wouldn't be that crazy. We had learned to fight
outnumbered and win. We had almost 300,000 in Europe. We trained hard, but
there was still time to get bored. I have not been bored since, and I don't think
we'll be bored for another 50 years. The world is just so interconnected and
complex.56

This concern about unpredictability is also manifest in most current US military operational
doctrine:
The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and can change rapidly,
requiring military leaders to maintain persistent military engagement with
multinational partners…The strategic environment is fluid, with continually
changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that
rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. While it is impossible to predict

53

Ibid., 95-105.
The assumption that the source and location of potential war during the Cold War was between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact in Europe was prevalent in both policy and academic debates in the 1980’s. For an example, see
John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, Eliot A. Cohen, Steven J. Zologa, Malcom Chalmers, and Lutz Unterseher,
“Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment and the Tank Gap Data Flap,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4
(Spring 1989): 128-179.
55
Jim Garamone, “Dunford Details Implications of Today’s Threats on Tomorrow’s Strategy,” US Department
of Defense News, August 23, 2016, accessed August 26, 2017,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/923685/dunford-details-implications-of-todays-threats-ontomorrows-strategy/.
56
Derek Grossman, “General Robert Brown on the U.S. Army’s Role in Asia,” The RAND Blog, October 25,
2017, accessed January 19, 2018, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/10/general-robert-brown-on-the-us-armys-rolein-asia.html.
54
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precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we can
expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will persist.57
In order to effectively deal with these types of unpredictable and sometimes unknowable threats,
major power militaries increased their use of shaping operations, especially non-traditional
military exercises.

State-Centric Approach to Military Statecraft
My argument concerning the rise of shaping operations assumes a ‘state-centric’ approach to
military statecraft: I presume that states—comprised of central decision-makers such as
executive national leaders, militaries, and foreign ministries—act as rational, unitary actors apart
from the private interests of bureaucracies and organizations. This framework assumes that in
the realms of foreign policy, security, and defense, government officials that lead major military
and foreign bureaucracies commonly act in pursuance of goals set by national leaders.58 Thus, I
expect that militaries generally pursue national (as opposed to private, bureaucratic) interests, of
which security is a vital state goal. I make this simplifying assumption for an important reason:
the conclusion of the Cold War resulted in a complex security environment in which civilian
leaders and diplomats often relied on military power to address strategic uncertainty.
Government leaders and military officers shared an interest in combating these ambiguous
threats and, given the blurring of ‘war’ and ‘peace’, the former largely delegated this task to the
latter.59 Thus, since civilian policymakers sought to reduce strategic uncertainty and expected
the military to accomplish this task, interests largely converged. However, there are three main
challenges to my argument and assumptions, described below.
Alternative Explanations
There are two alternatives that challenge my account of the rise of shaping operations after the
end of the Cold War. First, perhaps militaries use shaping operations to procure greater
organizational benefits, such as size, wealth, prestige, and autonomy. This explanation is
supported by some of the most prominent works in military doctrine. From this perspective,
armies favor certain doctrines in order to reduce organizational uncertainty on the battlefield and
to increase the military’s prestige and morale, its organizational size and wealth, and its
autonomy from civilian oversight.60 Because armies often pursue doctrines that are harmful to a
state’s political goals, civilian government officials are forced to intervene and change a
57

Joint Operations, US Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 17,
2017), I-2 through I-3.
58
My use of a state-centric approach is derived from Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw
Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 10-12, 26-27; my
approach is also similar to M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s
Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 13-14.
59
This understanding of civil-military relations in an era of ambiguous, non-state threats aligns with that of
Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2016).
60
Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 24-34; Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins
of the First World War,” International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 61-63; Posen, The Sources of Military
Doctrine, 41-51.
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military’s doctrine to better align with the state’s grand strategy.61 Failure to intervene in unwise
military doctrine can result in disintegrated foreign policy or, as was the case prior to World War
I, even great power war.62 These traditional works borrow heavily from organization theory and
bureaucratic politics to explain why militaries behave in ways counter to their governments’
goals.63 Thus, major power militaries may have used military exercises in the 1990’s and 2000’s
in order to serve these parochial interests rather than achieve the ends of grand strategy
established by civilian officials.
Second, shaping exercises may have served as an opportunity for major powers to
institutionalize cooperation among allies. Celeste Wallander, for instance, argues that exercises
comprise a key element of NATO’s integrated military command, which served as a specific
asset that allowed the alliance to survive in the mid-1990s after the threat of the Soviet Union
dissipated.64 In this sense, major powers may use military exercises to deepen relations with
allies. These alternative explanations will be tested in the quantitative tests below.
Research Design and Results
Research Design: Textual Analysis and Large-N Regression
In order to test my argument, I use textual analysis and multinomial logit models of dyads
between major powers and every other state in the international system from 1980 to 2016. My
outcome variable—exercise type, a nominal categorical variable—is the probability of
conducting a certain type of exercise, which assumes one of three values: no exercise, a
traditional exercise, or a shaping exercise. I derive observations from a new dataset of over
1,000 major power-led, land-based multinational military exercises from 1980 to 2016 that codes
each major training event by date, participant states, training tasks, number of troops, exercise
type, alliance or security organization involved, exercise program, and, if available, when the
exercise program began. Each exercise was reported in the news or announced by a military
public affairs office.
I include only land-based multinational military exercises in order to separate actual exercises
from workshops, seminars, or computer-simulated exercises65; I also exclude air, air defense, and
naval exercises. I exclusively test land-based exercises for both substantive and methodological
reasons. First, I focus on land armies since, as John Mearsheimer argues, controlling land is the,
61

Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 51-54.
Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” 58-107; Jack
Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Security 9, no. 1
(Summer 1984): 109-110.
63
The original organizational and bureaucratic politics models are described in Graham T. Allison, Essence of
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); see also Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla
A. Clapp, and Arnold Kantor, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 2006). In terms of Allison’s models, there is considerable overlap between the organizational and
bureaucratic models’ expectations of organizational behavior: see Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond,
“Rethinking Allison’s Models,” American Political Science Review 86, no. 2 (June 1992): 301-322. The traditional
works tend to include expectations from both models when explaining parochial military behavior.
64
Celeste Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International
Organization 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 714.
65
As opposed to computer-simulated and staff exercises, land-based exercises are financially costly and require
trade-offs by the participating militaries. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that staff exercises effectively signal
deterrence.
62
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“supreme political objective in a world of territorial states. Naval and air forces are simply not
suited for conquering territory.”66 Moreover, the traditional works in military doctrine and
power primarily focus on landpower, which allows me to test my argument against the
alternative suggested by these works.67 Second, although most states have at least a standing
army, not all states have an air or naval force, which would bias the dyad observation away from
these states.68 Additionally, naval and air training exercises are sometimes difficult to
distinguish from actual operations in the global commons (against, for instance, pirates, which
would be actual combat patrols instead of practice for combat).69 I borrow most observations
from a dataset compiled by Vito D’Orazio, but code more exercises and re-code some of his
observations to reflect exercise type, training task, number of troops, organization or alliance
involved, and exercise program history.70 Every exercise is coded by ‘type’, which I determined
by observing several indicators for each exercise: tasks that were trained, named ‘threat’ during
the exercise, number and type of troops, official and journalistic accounts, and exercise program
type and history.71
I then organize these observations into about 40,000 (directed) dyad years72 between each
major power and every other state in the international system using the EUGene software
66

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001),
86. Chapter 4 provides a longer justification of his argument.
67
For instance, in Military Power Stephen Biddle’s case studies and data are comprised of only land operations,
or as he expresses: “By ‘continental warfare’ I mean combat fought between military forces on or over major land
masses. I thus exclude war at sea, and strategic bombing against civilian targets.” See Biddle, Military Power, 6.
The majority of the case studies for the traditional works analyze land-based armies (see footnotes 12-19 for
examples of the traditional works in military doctrine and power).
68
For instance, according to the Military Balance, out of 48 states in Sub-Saharan Africa, only 40 states have an
“air force” or “air wing” and only 26 states have a “navy” or “maritime wing”. See “Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan
Africa,” The Military Balance 118, no. 1 (2018): 429-498.
69
For instance, the Indian military announced that the Indian and Indonesian navies were simultaneously
conducting a “coordinated patrol” to maintain open shipping lanes as well as a “bilateral maritime exercise,” both in
the Andaman Sea. See “Coordinated Patrol and India-Indonesia Bilateral Maritime Exercise Commence at
Belawan, Indonesia,” Indian Navy, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Accessed October, 14, 2018,
https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/coordinated-patrol-and-india-indonesia-bilateral-maritime-exercisecommence-belawan. Another example is when the Australian military responded to Russian bombers that were
either conducting an “exercise” or a “mission” over neutral waters. See Christopher Knaus, “Australian Air Force
Put on High Alert after Russian Long-Range Bombers Headed South,” The Guardian, December 29, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/30/australian-military-alert-russia-bombers-indonesia-exercises.
70
Vito D’Orazio, “Joint Military Exercises: 1970-2010 [dataset],” http://www.vitodorazio.com/data.html.
D’Orazio’s data was originally collected as part of his dissertation project; see Vito D’Orazio, “International
Military Cooperation: From Concepts to Constructs” (Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2013).
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Although the use of dyads in political science has come under recent scrutiny, I argue that my use of dyadyears is valid for two reasons. First, because I only include directed-dyads between seven major powers and the
other states in the international system, I avoid issues concerned with interdependence between states commonly
found in regular dyad datasets. In other words, the variation is largely with the partner, not the entire major powerpartner dyad. Although I group all major powers together for most of my tests in this chapter, the appendix provides
robustness checks for each individual major power. Second, although splitting multilateral events into bilateral
events could be problematic, I argue that MMEs are different from other major multinational events, such as wars or
treaties. That is, I believe there is little difference between bilateral and multilateral exercises: an exercise between
the US and Ghana or one between the US, Ghana, and other Asian and European partners are largely similar.
Moreover, these exercises are not as costly as war or treaties: militaries look forward to opportunities to send troops
for training, even among rival countries. More importantly, without the use of partner-years, I would be consciously
selecting on the dependent variable (MMEs that actually occur) and unable to observe the variation between partners
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developed by Scott Bennett and Allan Stam.73 Though the concept of ‘major power’ carries
different interpretations, I include as major powers those delineated by the authors of the
Correlates of War State System Membership Project, which is essentially a state that has certain
capabilities and behaviors reminiscent of a major power (agreed upon by the coders).74 From
1945-2016, these countries include the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia,
China, and Japan. However, I make two caveats to this list: (1) though Japan may be considered
an economic major power, I exclude the country due to its constitutional inability to project
military force outside of its borders75; (2) I include India, which, as of the most recent Correlates
of War National Material Capabilities (NMC) list, had the third highest Composite of National
Capabilities (CINC) behind the US and China and the fourth largest military in 2012.76 In order
to be included as a partner, a state’s military must comprise at least 1,000 troops, which I argue
is the least amount of total national troops possible for a state to be considered a potential
exercise-partner. Less than 1,000 national troops would call into a question a state’s ability to
manage military tasks both at home and send soldiers to international exercises.77
Though ostensibly ambiguous, I code my primary explanatory variable—strategic
uncertainty—using two indicators: one specifically for the US and the other for all major
powers. My first indicator— ‘doctrinal uncertainty’—is the perceived uncertainty expressed in
US Army operational doctrine. The US Army’s capstone operations manual, published about
once or twice a decade, serves as the organization’s formal statement of its military doctrine.78
Each version sets out the Army’s primary purpose, potential threats, and a description of how the
Army plans for its forces to be employed (operating concept). From 1976-2012, the US Army
published seven versions of its operations manual as either Field Manual (FM) 100-5, FM 3-0, or
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0.79 Figure 4 below describes each version of the Army’s
that are chosen for exercises and those that are not; thus, I would not be able to capture the counterfactual ‘nonMME’ and would consequently lose leverage over my argument. For a major critique of the use of dyads (which
guides my two points in defense), see Paul Poast, “Dyads Are Dead, Long Live Dyads! The Limits of Dyadic
Designs in International Relations Research,” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2016): 369-374.
73
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74
For my use of ‘major power’, see Correlates of War Project, "State System Membership List, v. 2016,"
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operations manual by year of publication, the major operating concept, the primary objective of
the US Army, named threats, and the number of times the words “uncertain” or “uncertainty” are
used in the manual. Specifically, the indicator is how often the words “uncertain” or
“uncertainty” are used in the manual as a proportion of total words. The major operating
concept, objectives, and threats are derived from either the preface, introduction, or Chapter 1 of
each manual, sections which serve as the overarching basis for the rest of the manual. This
indicator is used to test, specifically, US increases in shaping operations.

relatively concise ADPs. The US army released a new FM 3-0 in the fall of 2017, which will be discussed in the
conclusion of this article.
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Version of
U.S. Army
Operations
Manual

Year of
Publication

Number
of Pages
and
Words

Major Operating
Concept

FM 100-5:
Operations
FM 100-5:
Operations

1976

69
20,971
51
22,606

Active Defense

FM 100-5:
Operations

1986

207
94,115

AirLand Battle

FM 100-5:
Operations

1993

163
92,995

Full-Dimensional
Operations

FM 3-0:
Operations

2001

319
125,415

Full-Spectrum
Operations
(emphasizing
shaping)

FM 3-0:
Operations

2008

220
105,283

Full-Spectrum
Operations
(emphasizing
counterinsurgency
and stability
operations)

(1) ADP 3-0:
Unified Land
Operations

2011

28
7,747

Unified Land
Operations

1982

AirLand Battle

Named Primary
Threats

Warsaw Pact,
irregular units
Warsaw Pact and
Soviet-supported
insurgents and
terrorists
Warsaw Pact,
Soviet surrogates,
terrorist groups
Drug-trafficking,
natural or manmade disasters,
regional conflicts,
civil wars,
insurgencies,
extremists
Potential interstate
conflict, nonstate
actors, regional
powers,
transnational
groups (terrorism,
illegal drug trading,
illict arms
trafficking,
organized crime,
piracy,
environmental
damage).
Nation-states,
organizations,
people, groups,
coalitions, or
natural phenomena
able to damage or
destroy life.
Most likely hybrid
threats
(combination of
regular forces,
irregular forces,
terrorist forces,
criminal elements)

Use of the
words
“uncertain”
or
“uncertainty”
0
0

0%
0%
0%
0%

4

1.9%
.0043%

11

6.7%
.012%

30

9.4%
.024%

29

13%
.028%

2

7.1%
.026%

Figure 4: Textual Analysis of US Army Operations Manuals
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Uncertainty
as a portion
of total pages
(and words)

The second indicator for uncertainty—‘Post-Cold War Uncertainty”—measures strategic
uncertainty by differentiating two time periods: the Cold War (1980-1991) and Post-Cold War
(1992-2016). As explained in argument section above, the threat environment changed
considerably after the end of superpower rivalry and the collapse of communism. Moreover,
Figure 4 above reveals the change in the US Army’s perception of threats: from specifically the
Soviet Union and Soviet-backed insurgents during the Cold War to ambiguous, non-state threats
beginning in the early 1990’s. This indicator is used to test not only US but all major power
increases in shaping operations. My second explanatory variable—habitual military relations—
is coded by including a lagged dependent variable for all the models that do not include random
effects specifications.80 Below are the two hypotheses I test:
H1: An increase in doctrinal uncertainty is associated with an increase in the likelihood of
conducting a shaping exercise with a partner (US Only).
H2: An increase in post-Cold War uncertainty is associated with an increase in the likelihood of
conducting a shaping exercise with a partner (US and Non-US).
I include several covariates that represent either the alternative explanations or controls for
other factors that may influence decisions to implement shaping operations. The first alternative
explanation—concerning organizational benefits—is indicated through military spending, which
is the amount of money (in constant 2016 US Dollars) that the major power spent on its military
for a given year.81 States authorize military expenditures in order for militaries to fund training,
purchase equipment, and provide wages for military personnel; thus, militaries may seek to
increase expenditures to enjoy more resources for the organization. Ally represents the second
alternative explanation, which indicates whether the partner was an ally as categorized in the
previous section. Same region, contiguity, and sovereign history serve as geographic and
historical controls to determine whether major powers choose local partners or desire to
institutionalize cooperation with former colonies or republics.82 The outcome, explanatory, and
control variables are described in Figure 5 below.
I use three multinomial logit regression models to test my argument (all with clustered dyadyears): the first two only includes the US while the third involves all non-US major powers.
Since the outcome variable is multinomial, I do not apply fixed or random effects.

80

I do not include lagged dependent variables in the models applying random effects specifications since lagged
DVs cause a unit endogenous effect and bias in these types of models. See Paul Allison, “Don’t Put Lagged
Dependent Variables in Mixed Models,” Statistical Horizons, June 2, 2015, https://statisticalhorizons.com/laggeddependent-variables.
81
Military spending is for the entire state military, not just the land-based component that my exercises
represent. Specific land-based military expenditures is unavailable; however, total military expenditures should
serve as a useful proxy for organizational benefits. Military spending was derived from the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
82
Colonial and sovereign history was determined using the Correlates of War Project’s Colonial/Dependency
Contiguity dataset. See Correlates of War Project. 2017, "Colonial Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.1.”
Online, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/colonial-dependency-contiguity.
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Results
Table 1 below shows the results for the three models according to the value of the dependent
variable (the first value—no exercise—is the base outcome and is therefore not represented;
moreover, the other covariates are also repressed for clarity). Supporting the first hypothesis,
Model 1 reveals that an increase in doctrinal uncertainty is associated with an increase in the
probability of conducting a shaping exercise. When considering the first alternative explanation,
shaping is associated with a decrease in military spending, which is not puzzling when
considering that in comparison to traditional exercises, shaping training events are relatively
small in scale and far less expensive to execute. Conversely, doctrinal uncertainty is (weakly)
negatively associated with traditional exercises which means sense considering most of these
exercises are used to rehearse for missions or deter a known threat. Moreover, traditional
exercises are associated with an increase in military spending since these training events are
much larger in scale and resources than shaping exercises. Concerning the second alternative,
although the probability of shaping increases slightly with an ally, traditional exercises are far
more likely to be carried out between allies (since shaping is more often conducted to recruit
non-allies). It is also apparent that states are far more likely to hold an exercise with the US if
they have done so in the past year, affirming the theory that exercise relations because ‘sticky’
over time. Models 2 and 3 display the results for the second hypothesis in which Post-Cold War
Uncertainty is the indicator for doctrinal uncertainty (Model 2 for the US and Model 3 for nonUS major powers). The results are similar to Model 1 with the exception that there is a slight
positive correlation between military spending and the probability of holding a shaping exercise
for non-US major powers.
Since the dependent variable is a nominal categorical variable, the coefficients for the results
only indicate the direction and statistical significance for the relationships between the variables.
Therefore, Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 below display the marginal effects of each of the explanatory
variables and covariates on the values of the dependent variable: “N” indicates no exercise, “T”
indicates a traditional exercise, and “S” indicates a shaping exercise.83 Figure 6 shows the
positive effect of doctrinal uncertainty on the probability of the US holding a shaping exercise,
confirming the predictions of the first hypothesis. Figure 7 displays the marginal effect of the
two explanatory variables and the alternatives on each of the nominal outcomes for Model 1: a
standard deviation increase in doctrinal uncertainty is associated with a stronger influence on
shaping than a previous year’s exercise, military spending, or being an ally. Figures 8 and 9
show similar results for Models 2 and 3, respectively, also confirming the results of the
predictions for Hypotheses 1 and 2.

83

Marginal effects plots were developed using the techniques in Long and Freese, Regression Models for
Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata (College Station: State Press, 2014).

23

Model 2
Post-Cold War
Uncertainty (US)

Model 3
Post-Cold War
Uncertainty (Non-US)

-0.0453

-0.351**

(-0.24)

(-2.84)

0.856***

0.866***

1.000***

(6.55)

(6.82)

(15.76)

1.094**

1.049**

1.116***

(2.68)

(2.76)

(9.18)

3.282***

3.286***

3.088***

(7.30)

(7.33)

(10.41)

3.519***

3.554***

(6.39)

(6.36)

0.956***

0.980***

1.200***

(9.65)

(10.02)

(16.13)

-2.850***

-0.127

0.577***

(-9.53)

(-0.48)

(6.00)

1.440***

1.465***

1.151***

(9.33)

(9.62)

(9.67)

Pseudo-R2

.286

.291

.315

N

5953

5953

30706

BIC

5906

5873

13031

Dependent Variable:
Exercise Type

Model 1
Doctrinal Uncertainty
(US)

Outcome:
Traditional Exercise
Doctrinal Uncertainty

-0.0198
(-0.20)

Post-Cold War
Uncertainty
Lag Shaping MME

Military Spending

Ally

Outcome:
Shaping Exercise
Doctrinal Uncertainty

1.116***
(16.03)

Post-Cold War
Uncertainty
Lag Shaping MME

Military Spending

Ally

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001
Table 1: Results for H1 and H2
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Figure 6: Marginal Plot for Model 1

Figure 7: Marginal Effects for Variables (Model 1)
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Figure 8: Marginal Effects for Variables (Model 2)

Figure 9: Marginal Effects for Variables (Model 3)
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Conclusion
The remarkable increase in multinational exercises since the end of the Cold War should alert
scholars and practitioners alike to the growing need for a more comprehensive understanding of
military statecraft. Operations such as multinational exercises, military diplomacy, officer
exchanges, and military aid should reveal how states use their military to manage diverse threats
in a complex environment of costly war, emerging great power competition, and the persistent
threat of violent non-state actors. Although shaping was a prominent activity of all major powers
since the end of the Cold War, the apparent return of great power rivalry may raise the question
about whether shaping to combat non-state actors will continue to be a prominent foreign policy
tool. Figure 7 below reveals that traditional exercises are making a comeback in world politics,
especially as a result of NATO’s exercises as part of the European Reassurance Initiative and
Operation Atlantic Resolve. According to my dataset, traditional exercises grew from 9 in 2010
to 33 in 2016: that is, by a factor of 3.6. In 2014, the same year in which Russia invaded and
annexed the Ukrainian province of Crimea, traditional exercises eclipsed shaping for two years
straight for the first time since 1994. This return of traditional exercises may encourage scholars
to retain conventional understandings of military doctrine and power that were developed during
the Cold War. Yet what is also interesting about this graph is that both traditional and shaping
exercises seem to be on an upward trend: that is, responses to threats both known and unknown
are rising.

Figure 7: Traditional and Shaping Exercises, 1980-2016
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I anticipate that military exercises, both traditional and shaping, will continue to proliferate for
three reasons. First, although some major powers are beginning to become more ‘certain’ about
their threats (for instance, as expressed in the 2017 US National Security Strategy)84, the
persistent threat of violent non-state actors seems to be a problem that is difficult to ignore:
August 2017 Pew Global Attitudes survey, respondents believed that the two greatest threats to
national security were the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and global climate change
(Americans and Russians agreed that ISIS posed the greatest threat).85 Second, major powers
can use shaping exercises as a tool to balance one another. Recruitment exercises are not only
useful for gathering support for peacekeeping missions, but can also be leveraged to draw closer
ties to potential allies in order to balance a major rival. For instance, the US and Russia appear
to be supplying and training opposing sides in the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria,86 while Russia
and China have begun exercise programs with new partners such as Pakistan and Egypt.87 Third,
due to the habitual nature of military exercises, militaries develop relationships through exercises
that are difficult to break.
Despite the renewed interest in other forms of statecraft—especially economic88—our
understanding of foreign policy carried out by the military in non-traditional ways is limited; this
article seeks to shed light on the use of military as a broad tool of diplomacy. 89 In order to better
understand and anticipate the use of military forces to achieve foreign policy ends, both
traditional and shaping, I argue that the security studies literature explore military statecraft more
holistically. The current environment, comprised of a mix of great power competition and the
persistent threat of non-state actors, necessitates a fresh approach. Without a better
understanding, we will experience great difficulty in explaining the gravest challenges in world
politics.

Donald J. Trump, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” Executive Office of the
President Washington DC, 2017.
85
Cyber attacks from other countries and the condition of the global economy tied for third, refugee movements
held fourth, while the influence of the US, Russia, and China ranked lower. Pew Research Center, “Globally,
People Point to ISIS and Climate Change as Leading Security Threats,” August 1, 2017,
www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/01/gobally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-threats.
86
Samuel Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid War,” Survival, Vol. 57, No. 6 (December 2015- January 2016): 5158.
87
For instance, Russia and Pakistan held their first joint exercise in 2016 and plan on holding exercises
annually. See Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia and Pakistan to Hold First Ever Military Exercise,” The Diplomat,
September 14, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/russia-and-pakistan-to-hold-first-ever-military-exercise/.
88
See, for instance, William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and
State Control (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017); Cynthia Roberts, Leslie Armijo, and Saori Katada, The
BRICS and Collective Financial Statecraft (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Robert D. Blackwill and
Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2016).
89
Other scholars have pointed to the need for a better understanding of military exercises; see Beatrice Heuser
and Harold Simpson, “The Missing Political Dimension of Military Exercises,” RUSI Journal 162, No. 3 (June/July
2017): 20-28. Although there have been some attempts to better understand the use of exercises to achieve political
goals, there have been few comprehensive studies to date. For a recent assessment of certain major exercises, see
Beatrice Heuser, Tormod Heier, and Guillaume Lasconjarias, eds., Military Exercises: Political Messaging and
Strategic Impact, NATO Defence College Forum Paper 26, 2018,
http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1157.
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APPENDIX

Figure A.1: Multinational Exercises by Major Power, 1980-2016 (NATO and Non-NATO
29

30

Conventional-Maneuver,
CounterinsurgencyCounterterrorism,
Peacekeeping-Stability,
Humanitarian-Disaster
Relief

Recruitment

External to
Partners

Internal to
Partners

Internal to
Partners or
Regional
Peacekeeping

External or
Internal to
Partners

External to
Partners

“Defend our interests”
“Deterrence”
“Reassure Allies”

External to
Partners

e.g. “Partnership for Peace”,
“INDRA”, “Yudh Abhyas”

e.g. “Interaction”,
“Frontier”, “Balance
Piston”, “Steppe Eagle”

Similar to capacity-building,
but partner militaries are
more advanced and major
power influence more subtle.
“Familiarize with new
weaponry”
“Gathering Support”
“Build Relationship”
“Friendship”
“Improve military
cooperation”

e.g. “Flintlock, RECAMP”,
“BMATT”

e.g. “Hand-in-Hand”

Usually no exercise
program; used as preparation
for deployment or potential
mission

e.g. “NATO REFORGER”

Exercise Program and
History

“Building Partner Capacity”
“Strengthen Ability to
Defend Itself”
“Upgrading fighting
capabilities”
“Bolster Foreign Troops”
“Special Forces Trainers”

“Building Trust” “History of
Hostility”

“Interoperability”
“Preparation for
deployment”
“Test Ability to Work
Together”

Official Statements and
News Coverage

Named
Exercise
Threat

Figure A.1: Summary of Indicators for MME Type

Small, largely
symbolic
(100-500 troops)

CounterinsurgencyCounterterror,
Peacekeeping-Stability

TrustDeveloping

RoleForming

CounterinsurgencyCounterterrorism,
Peacekeeping,
Humanitarian-Disaster
Relief

Rehearsal

Major power sends
small units or limited
number of trainers
compared to partner
military

Small, largely
symbolic
(100-500 troops)

Conventional-Maneuver,
CounterinsurgencyCounterterrorism,
Peacekeeping-Stability,
Humanitarian-Disaster
Relief

Conventional-Maneuver,
CounterinsurgencyCounterterrorism,
Peacekeeping-Stability

Approximately the
number that would
be used during
deployment

Conventional-Maneuver
Only

Deterrence

CapacityBuilding

Significant for
deterrence (usually
more than 5,000
troops)

Major power sends
small units or limited
number of trainers
compared to partner
military

Number of Troops

Training Tasks Exercised
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Oman
Pakistan
UAE
Qatar
Bangladesh

Niger

Partner 6

Partner 7

Partner 8

Partner 9

Partner 10

Partner 11

Sweden

Saudi Arabia

Pakistan

Nigeria

New Zealand

Morocco

Kuwait

India

Botswana
Egypt

Australia

Argentina

Trinidad and
Tobago
Bahamas

Lithuania

Latvia

Jordan

Hungary

Finland

Estonia

Egypt

Czech
Republic

Antigua and
Barbuda

Guyana

Austria
Bulgaria

Albania

USA, UK,
France,
Germany

Yost, 195-196

Peacekeeping

12/xx/1995
12/xx/1996
NATO

Bosnia
Intervention
IFOR

Jamaica
Barbados

Belize

USA

Haiti
Intervention
(Op. Uphold
Democracy)
7/xx/1994
3/31/1995
UN
Conventional,
Peacekeeping
Finnemore,
138;
Kreps, 78-79

Figure A.2: Major Power-Led Coalitions (Part 1)

Kuwait

Partner 5

Egypt
Syria

Saudi Arabia

USA, UK,
France,
Germany

USA, UK,
France,
Germany

Morocco

Chad

“SomaliaUNOSOM I.”

Somalia
Intervention
(Op. Restore
Hope)
12/3/1992
5/xx/1993
UNITAF
HumanitarianDisaster Relief

Finnemore, 138

Conventional

11/1/1990
2/1/1991

Gulf War

Partner 4

Chad

Zaire (DRC)

France

Major Powers

Non-Allied
Coalition Partner 1
Partner 2
Partner 3

Finnemore, 132

Source

France

Conventional,
Peacekeeping
Wolford, 50;
Nolushingu,
12

Conventional,
Peacekeeping

Type of Operation

Chad
Intervention
1986
1987

Chad
Intervention
1982

Date Start
Date End
Organization

War/Coalition
Name

Finland
Hungary
(member
MAR 1999)
Iceland
Jordan (left
1998)
Latvia

Estonia

Austria
Bulgaria
Czech
Republic
(member
MAR 1999)
Egypt (left
1998)

Albania

USA, UK,
France,
Germany

Yost, 195-196

Peacekeeping

12/xx/1996
12/xx/2005
NATO

Bosnia
Intervention
SFOR
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Argentina
Senegal
Bahrain
Czechoslovakia

Partner 13

Partner 14

Partner 15

Partner 16
Partner 17
Partner 18
Partner 19
Partner 20
Partner 21
Partner 22
Partner 23
Partner 24
Partner 25
Partner 26
Partner 27
Partner 28
Partner 29
Partner 30

Zimbabwe

UAE

Tunisia
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Sweden

Partner 12

Russia
Sweden
Ukraine

Romania

Poland

Morocco

Malaysia

Lithuania
Malaysia (left
1998)
Morocco
Poland
(member
MAR 1999)
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
Sweden
Ukraine
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Georgia (left in 2008)

Partner 9

Partner 7

Partner 8

Croatia (after 2000)
(member 2009)

Azerbaijan (left in
2008)
Bulgaria (member
MAR 2004)

Estonia (member
MAR 2004)
Finland

Partner 6

Partner 5

Partner 4

Austria

Partner 3

Non-Allied
Coalition
Partner 1

Armenia (after 2000)

Albania (after 2000)

Major Powers

Partner 2

USA, UK, France,
Germany

USA, UK, France,
Germany

Source

Ireland

Georgia

Finland

Bosnia

Azerbaijan

Austria

Australia

Armenia

USA, UK,
France, Germany

NATO Online“ISAF Troop
Contributing
Nations.”

NATO
ISAF/OEF/Res.
Support.
10/xx/2001
NATO
Conventional,
COIN

Czech Republic

Armenia (JAN 2005-OCT
2008)
Australia (2003, JUN 2005JUL 2009)
Azerbaijan (MAY 2003 DEC 2008)
Bosnia (JUN 2005 - NOV
2008)
Bulgaria (AUG 2003 - DEC
2005, MAR 2006 - DEC
2008)

Albania (APR 2003-DEC
2008)

USA, UK

Carney- Allied Participation
in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Conventional, COIN

Conventional, COIN

UAE

Sweden

Saudi Arabia
(Training Grounds)

Jordan (Training
Grounds)
Qatar (Training
Grounds)

New Zealand

Finland

Australia

McGinnis“Coalition
Contributions to
Countering the
Islamic State.”
USA, UK, France,
Germany

8/8/2014
-

Anti-ISIS (Op.
Inherent Resolve)

3/xx/2003
12/31/2011

Multi-National Force- Iraq
2003

Denmark
Dominican Republic (APR
Jordan
2003 - MAY 2004)
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Macedonia

NATO Online“Operations and
Missions: Past and
Present.”

Bescht, 95.
NATO Online“KFOR Troop
Contributions”

NATO
Peacekeeping
Macedonia
8/xx/2001
3/xx/2003
NATO
Peacekeeping

xx/xx/1999
NATO

Kosovo Intervention
KFOR

Peacekeeping

Date Start
Date End
Organization
Type of
Operation

War/Coalition
Name
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Switzerland
UAE (left in 2001)
Ukraine

Partner 21

Partner 22

Partner 23
Partner 24

Partner 30

Partner 28
Partner 29

Partner 27

Partner 26

Partner 25

Sweden

Jordan (left before
2012)
Latvia (member
MAR 2004)
Lithuania (member
MAR 2004)
Moldova (began
2014)
Morocco
Romania (member
MAR 2004)
Russia (left JUL
2003)
Slovakia (member
MAR 2004)
Slovenia (member
MAR 2004)

Ireland

Partner 20

Partner 19

Partner 18

Partner 17

Partner 16

Partner 15

Partner 14

Partner 13

Partner 12

Partner 11

Partner 10

Kazakhstan (SEP 2003 - OCT
2008) KAZBAT!
Latvia (MAY 2003 - NOV
2008)
Lithuania (AUG 2003 - JUL
2007)
Macedonia (JUN 2003 - DEC
2008)
Moldova (SEP 2008 - DEC
2008)
Mongolia (SEP 2003 - SEP
2008)
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua (SEP 2003 - FEB
2004)
Norway
Philippines (July 2003 - July
2004)
Poland
Portugal
South Korea (APR 2003 DEC 2008)

Japan (FEB 2004 - JUL 2006)

Italy

Hungary

El Salvador (AUG 2003 JAN 2009)
Estonia (JUN 2003 - FEB
2009)
Georgia (AUG 2003 - AUG
2008)
Honduras (AUG 2003 - APR
2004)
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Philippines
(OEF-P)

Albania

Croatia

Ukraine

UAE

Sweden

Singapore

New Zealand

Macedonia
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Partner 36

Partner 35

Partner 34

Partner 33

Partner 32

Partner 31
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Romania (JUL 2003 - JUL
2009)
Slovakia (8 JUN 2003 - FEB
2007)
Spain (MAR 2003 - APRIL
2004)
Thailand (SEP 2003 - SEP
2004)
Tonga (JUN - DEC 2004,
AUG - NOV 2008)
Ukraine (MAR 2003 - DEC
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